When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable? Introduction to Symposium, Negligence in Criminal Law and Morality
Kenneth W. Simons, When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable? Introduction to Symposium, Negligence in Criminal Law and Morality, 5 Crim. L. Phil. 97 (2011).
Doug Husak suggests that sometimes an actor should be deemed reckless, and not merely negligent, with respect to the risks that she knowingly created but has forgotten at the moment of action. The validity of this conclusion, he points out, depends crucially on what it means to be aware of a risk. Husak’s ‘‘neutral prompt’’ and ‘‘counterfactual actual belief’’ criteria are problematic, however. More persuasive is his suggestion that we understand belief, in this moral and criminal law context, as a concept whose meaning is determined by its function as a culpability standard. Husak concludes that inadvertent actors are often less culpable than knowing-but-later-forgetful actors; this is plausible, but there are also numerous counterexamples.
Holly Smith focuses on negligence cases in which an agent’s failure to notice a risk stems, not from a prior culpable choice, but from an objectionable attitude or set of attitudes. She is right to emphasize that genuine moral culpability does not depend on conscious choice. However, Smith also asserts that decisions that flow from an actor’s objectionable attitudes are only rarely culpable, because they often do not arise from a reasonably full configuration of the actor’s motives. This last requirement is, I fear, an unrealistic and unnecessarily demanding criterion of culpability. Even when many of the actor’s evaluative attitudes are ‘‘inactive’’ in Smith’s sense, the actor might deserve blame for not bringing them to bear on his decision.
Michael Moore and Heidi Hurd thoroughly explore, and find deficient, H.L.A. Hart’s ‘‘unexercised capacity’’ theory of negligence. They are correct that that theory requires a further judgment: an actor’s inadvertence is culpable only if he had the capacity to have adverted ‘‘if X’’ where X is the source of the actor’s moral desert. They overstate, however, in suggesting that the capacity issue falls out of the picture once we identify that underlying desert basis. The authors also worry that if desert is grounded on an underlying vice, we lack a reliable way of ranking the different vices that might explain the actor’s inadvertence; this is not a fatal objection, however, because negligence determinations are quite feasible even in the absence of clear rankings. Moore and Hurd conclude by identifying eight distinct categories in which criminal liability for negligence is justifiable. Negligence is indeed a surprisingly complex and pluralist concept.
The three articles in this symposium brightly illuminate some of the most fundamental conceptual and normative issues in the debate over whether it is just to blame and punish the negligently inadvertent.