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The Contract State, Program Failure, and Congressional Intent: The Case of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program

Alan White*

If a future administration were to adopt sweeping student loan forgiveness, the contract state may stand in the way of actual debt cancellation. In the likely event that Congress were to adopt something short of universal and immediate student loan forgiveness, the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) experience teaches us that the federal bureaucracy is unlikely to deliver fully on the legislative promise. In the first two years of the PSLF program, nearly 100,000 student loan borrowers have applied, and the Department of Education’s contractor has denied roughly 99,000 of those applications. The Department blames Congress for an unduly complex program design and borrowers for applying without understanding the eligibility rules. Given that PSLF has only four basic eligibility tests and that applicants are college graduates who can presumably read and count, this narrative seems implausible to explain a ninety-nine percent denial rate. Evidence from oversight agency reports, state attorney general and class action lawsuits, and thousands of borrower complaints logged by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau tell a different story—a story of agency failure to implement and oversee the program, and of widespread contractor errors and misrepresentations. This Article explores the PSLF failure in detail, as an exemplar of the dysfunction of the contract state. I describe the legislative goals motivating student loan forgiveness and the contract architecture of the state-servicer relationship that administers a multibillion-dollar government loan repayment and cancellation program. I then evaluate the political and legal accountability for failure, and the promise and perils of the contract state.

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Introduction

The explosion of student loan debt in the United States resulted from fifty years of shifting congressional policy choices and has prompted calls for wholesale

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debt cancellation. As federal student loan programs evolved, Congress adopted a variety of loan discharge and cancellation programs, including the 2007 Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) Program. The catastrophic experience with PSLF has brought to the fore the contradictions plaguing the Education Department and its contracting out of student loan administration. In this Article, I briefly review the history and competing goals of the Higher Education Act’s student loan programs, how the programs came to be operated by a privatized agency-contractor model, how and why the PSLF program has failed, how that failure reflects deep failures of the contract state, and what lessons can be learned.

I. COMPETING GOALS OF THE TITLE IV STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM

As federal student loans evolved from a minor supplement to the primary funder for college, Congress incrementally charged the U.S. Department of Education (USED) not only with conventional loan administration and collection goals, but also with administering a variety of borrower relief programs, including income-dependent payment options and a variety of forgiveness and discharge programs targeted to various vulnerable or deserving borrowers.

The original vision of the 1965 Higher Education Act (HEA) was to consolidate federal funding for students and institutions and to achieve equal educational opportunity through a system of grants for low-income students and inexpensive loans for the middle class. The HEA created a federally guaranteed privately funded student loan program. Banks made loans, state nonprofit agencies provided guarantees to the lenders, and the federal government reinsured the state guarantee agencies, in what is now known as the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program. Some defaulted loans ended up being held by USED, which used private collection agencies to enforce them, largely through administrative wage garnishments and tax refund intercepts. In the early period, USED’s role, apart

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5. The U.S. Department of Education (USED) was created as a separate cabinet-level agency in 1980. Prior to 1980 the Office of Education within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) administered federal education programs.
9. Id.
from institutional gatekeeping, i.e. determining which colleges and universities could participate, was to oversee state nonprofit loan guarantee agencies and act as a reinsurer.11

By the end of the 1980s, loan volume was rapidly outpacing federal grants.12 Congressional Democrats sought in the 1992 reauthorization to restore the vision of redistribution through student aid by strengthening grants to needy students.13 However, the legislative process, the crosscurrents of interest group, agency, and staff influence, and the growing dominance of antideficit ideology led to a major shift from grants to loans, converting higher education from a publicly funded social good to a privately financed consumer product.14 The 1992 Act’s increase in loan limits and introduction of the Federal Direct Loan program signaled the evolution of USED into a giant loan collection bureau. At the same time, however, the 1992 reauthorization introduced income-based repayment plans15 and added new loan discharges for borrowers victimized by closed or fraudulent for-profit trade schools.16 In other words, the 1992 legislation charged the Department with not only loan collection and loan default reduction goals, but also with debt reduction and relief goals for congressionally favored borrowers.

Introduced as a pilot program in the 1992 Higher Education Reauthorization Act,17 Federal Direct Loans were made from the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) funds, disbursed to universities, and repaid to the Treasury via private servicing contractors. From 1992 to 2008, Congress prevented Direct Loans from fully displacing federally guaranteed FFEL loans, which were quite profitable for banks. As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, banks suddenly faced serious liquidity problems and were unable to continue funding student loans.18 The federal government stepped in and purchased FFEL loans in a lesser-known aspect of the

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13. Id. at 507.
14. Id. at 524.
16. Id. § 428.
17. Id. § 451; Herrine, supra note 4, at 294 n.61.
financial bailout. In 2010, the Obama administration ended the FFEL program, in part because of the private market funding problem and in part because Direct Loans had consistently proven less costly to the Treasury than the subsidized FFEL loans. The share of new student loan originations went from eighty percent FFEL to 100% Direct Loans in the space of two to three years, requiring a massive shift in loan servicing arrangements and leading to the present-day model with a public agency overseeing massive contracts with private loan servicers.

II. HISTORY OF THE USED DIRECT LOAN SERVICING CONTRACTS

A. Contracting Out—Advocates and Critics

At least since the 1960s, the federal government has relied on private contractors as well as public agencies to deliver a range of social services. A widely influential 1992 book by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, accelerated the push for privatization of public services. Gaebler and Osborne called for government agencies to measure outcomes rather than inputs, embrace competition, privatize and contract out services, and focus on strategy and goals rather than processes. Vice President Al Gore adopted the “reinventing government” mantra and advocated many of the Gaebler/Osborne recommendations, including more privatization and contracting out. The profound influence of Reinventing Government is evident in USED’s approach to administering the student loan programs, relying as it has on private contractors to service its expanding loan portfolio.

As a theoretical matter, neoclassical economists argue that competition among private contractors should result in more efficient and lower-cost delivery of services than public agency employees. On the other hand, economists have also pointed out that contracting out results in more transaction and agency costs,

24. Id.
particularly when the government agency needs to intervene to modify the public services being offered:

Sources of potentially high costs associated with contracting out include asymmetric information, the management and supervision of contracts, “non-contractible” elements related to service delivery (such as in the case of confidence goods), contractual incompleteness and limited availability of competitive suppliers in the market (citations omitted). Following from this, it has also been argued that even if government contracting has positive effects over the short term, the potential cost savings from outsourcing may diminish or disappear over time by rising prices of the private sector companies due to the so-called “hold-up” problem (citations omitted). When contracts are highly complex or incomplete, governments may need to renegotiate the contract in the case of an unforeseen problem or event. This not only has costs, it also gives the private firm – with its incentives to maximize profits – the opportunity to raise the prices it charges to governments (citation omitted). If goods or services are contracted out over the long-term, governments may irrevocably lose their capabilities as provider, increasing the bargaining power of the private provider(s).

Empirical studies have shown that contracting out public services, including education, may cost more because of the need for agency contract design and monitoring. The New Public Management of the 1980s, embracing privatization and efficiency, drew increasing criticism from advocates of the New Public Service, who argued that equity and democratic participation should remain key objectives for government agencies and that program outcomes to be measured should not be left to agency bureaucrats but should engage citizen participation in their formulation. Among other criticisms, the New Public Service advocates point out that New Public Management reduces citizens to customers and prizes efficiency above other values, a criticism that is germane to USED’s contracting approach for handling its trillion-dollar portfolio of student loans.

31. Id. at 668–69.
B. USED Student Loan Administration—From Reinsurer to Servicing Contract Overseer

Eric Fink and Roland Zullo describe the evolution of USED’s public-private contracting structure for administering student loans in an excellent paper. The Education Department had used a single servicing contractor, ACS Education Solutions, LLC, to service the relatively small Federal Direct Loan portfolio prior to 2008. To deal with the shift to 100% Federal Direct Loans, USED contracted with four of the largest players in the FFEL Program (Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA), Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Sallie Mae/Navient, and NelNet Loan Servicing) known as the TIVAS, or Title IV additional servicers, and also with nonprofit servicers that previously serviced FFEL loans. PHEAA was the Pennsylvania state FFEL guarantor and also runs various state-funded financial aid programs. It services Direct Loans through a subsidiary known as FedLoan. Navient is the renamed Sallie Mae, once the largest secondary market purchaser of FFEL loans. From 2010 to 2013, Congress required USED to award servicing contracts to several grandfathered nonprofit servicers and to pay them higher fees than the “TIVAS,” to the tune of $3.1 billion. This subsidy was eliminated in the 2014 budget.

The private contractors dominate the contracting partnership that administers the huge federal student loan program. Fink and Zullo estimate that the annual total paid to federal loan servicers in 2013 was just over a billion dollars, while USED spent an estimated $9.5 million on salaries of agency contract monitoring staff. While the contractor payments dwarf the agency oversight budget, the combined servicing cost nevertheless represents less than one-tenth of one percent of the federal loan portfolio, which surpassed the trillion-dollar mark in 2013. USED separately contracted with debt collection firms to handle loans that have gone into default. The 2018 collection firm contracts with two collectors are estimated to be worth $400 million.

32. Fink & Zullo, supra note 11.
34. Id. at 5.
36. See id.
37. Fink & Zullo, supra note 11, at 5.
38. Id.
39. Id.
41. Fink & Zullo, supra note 11, at 4.
large nonprofit servicers has thus come to be charged with implementing federal policy goals for student loans.

C. Servicing Contract Incentives and Outcomes—No Rewards for Borrower Relief

USED pays student loan servicers a small fixed monthly fee for each student loan.\(^{43}\) The monthly fee is highest for loans in current payment status and is reduced progressively for loans in increasing stages of delinquency.\(^{44}\) The servicing contracts provide two incentives for servicers to keep borrowers current in payments (or in deferment or forbearance).\(^{45}\) In addition to the sliding scale of monthly fees, the contracts reallocate loan volume among servicers each year based on a set of performance measures. The performance measures include the following:

1. Defaulted Loan Volume. Measured as a percentage of the servicer’s portfolio;
2. Defaulted Borrowers. Measured as a percentage of all borrowers in the servicer’s portfolio;
3. Borrower Satisfaction. Measured by surveys of borrowers;
4. School Satisfaction. Measured by surveys of post-secondary schools;
5. FSA (Federal Student Aid office within USED) Satisfaction. Measured by surveys of FSA personnel.\(^{46}\)

Fink and Zullo contend that these two sets of contractual incentives align poorly with the goals of the student loan program.\(^{47}\) Neither the meager dollars gained by converting a delinquent loan to current nor the possible increase in future loan volume approach the significant cost of even a thirty-minute staff conversation with a delinquent borrower.\(^{48}\) As a result, the servicers’ profit-maximizing strategy is simply to minimize expenses by reducing and underpaying customer service staff. Fink and Zullo conclude with a variety of recommendations, including a proposal to establish a public servicer to compete with the private agencies, located perhaps in the Treasury Department, IRS, or U.S. Postal Service.\(^{49}\)

The only additional payment USED makes to its contractor to evaluate borrower applications for PSLF is a one-time, five-dollar payment when PHEAA/FedLoan first approves an Employer Certification Form (ECF) submitted by the borrower.\(^{50}\) PSLF is a loan benefit that requires the servicer to monitor payments over ten or more years, as well as to review employer certification paperwork and

\(^{43}\) Fink & Zullo, supra note 11, at 8.
\(^{44}\) Id.
\(^{45}\) Id.
\(^{46}\) Id.
\(^{47}\) Id. at 9–10.
\(^{48}\) Id.
\(^{49}\) Id. at 13.
to evaluate the complete (or incomplete) borrower application at the end of the ten-year period. Such an obviously insufficient payment reflects an agency culture and decision-making where cost minimization predominates over other borrower relief goals of the student loan program.

III. THE PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS FAILURE

A. Education Department Rejects Nearly All PSLF Applications

Public Service Loan Forgiveness was adopted by a bipartisan majority in Congress and was signed into law by President Bush in 2007. PSLF was originally conceived as a niche benefit with little or no significant budgetary cost. As the program and higher education financing have evolved, PSLF could serve in the future to cancel student loan debt for the one in five borrowers who work for public and nonprofit employers, enabling them to buy houses and cars, start small businesses, and otherwise reenter and massively stimulate the economy. To date, more than 1.1 million borrowers in repayment have submitted approved public service employer certifications.

In the first two years that borrowers began applying for loan forgiveness, fewer than one percent (845 out of 90,962) were approved. Education Secretary Betsy DeVos and the Republican administration had no love for the program, proposing in each annual budget to eliminate it, but the failure to implement the law resulted from a perfect storm of misaligned contract incentives, agency and contractor indifference and neglect, poor contract oversight, and cumbersome agency regulations, in addition to flaws in the original legislative design.

Congress created the PSLF Program as part of the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 in order to forgive eligible public servants’ loans after 120 on-time qualifying payments. To qualify for PSLF, borrowers must (1) have Direct Loans, or consolidate Federal Family Education Loans into Direct Loans, (2) be

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51. See 20 U.S.C. §1087c(m).
53. Because borrowers would need to be in Federal Direct loans to qualify, cost estimates assumed borrowers in FFEL loans would consolidate into Direct Loans, thus increasing Direct Loan share of the portfolio. Federal Direct loans have lower net cost to the Treasury than FFEL loans. In 2009, the Obama administration eliminated new FFEL loans and made all federal loans Direct Loans.
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1087c(m).
employed full-time by a qualifying public service employer or employers, (3) make 120 on-time qualifying payments (4) on a qualifying repayment plan, and (5) complete the PSLF Application for Forgiveness.\[58\] In other words, borrowers must have the right loans, the right employer, and be in the right repayment plans, all while making 120 on-time payments. Eligible borrowers could have begun making qualifying payments as of October 1, 2007.\[59\] October 1, 2017 was the earliest borrowers could theoretically apply for PSLF. The U.S. Department of Education (USED) contracted with the PHEAA and its servicing arm FedLoan to administer all student loan accounts of borrowers applying for PSLF and to evaluate PSLF applications.\[60\]

Since borrowers have been eligible to apply for forgiveness, the rate of successful applications has been shockingly low. Federal Student Aid (FSA), the office of USED responsible for administering federal student loans, issues quarterly PSLF Program Data reports.\[61\] In the release covering the period through June 30, 2019, FSA reported that 90,962 unique borrowers had submitted PSLF applications, covering 110,729 loans.\[62\] Of those loans, 102,051 were processed and 1,216 (representing 845 unique borrowers) were approved for discharge by the loan servicer.\[63\] The successful applications accounted for barely one percent of processed PSLF applications.\[64\] A spate of news outlets reported stories of borrowers who believed they qualified for PSLF loan discharge yet were being rejected at an alarming rate.\[65\] Several state attorneys general and borrower class action representatives sued PHEAA, alleging systematic misrepresentations and malfeasance in its administration of PSLF.\[66\] Many of the rejected applicants report

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61. See, e.g., JUNE DATA REPORT, supra note 55.
62. Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
63. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
64. See id.
66. See infra notes 71–72.
being told by their student loan servicers that they were meeting all the requirements and on track to having their loans forgiven.\footnote{See infra notes 88–89.} As a matter of simple logic, it seems unlikely that tens of thousands of former college students, representing ninety-nine percent of applicants, would knowingly apply for a program whose eligibility rules they do not meet. Federal agency reports, media narratives, and litigation documents reveal the reasons for the PSLF failures and recommend oversight, contractual, regulatory, and legislative fixes.

B. Reasons for PSLF Denials


USED provides limited information in its data report on the reasons so many PSLF applications were denied.\footnote{See, e.g., JUNE DATA REPORT, supra note 55.} The report divides denials into five categories: [insufficient] Qualifying Payments (53%), Missing Information (25%), No Eligible Loans (16%), Employment Dates (2%), and Employer Not Eligible (2%).\footnote{Id.} These report categories do not align with the four eligibility criteria because “Qualifying Payments” conflates three criteria: 120 on-time payments, payments made while working full-time for a qualifying public service employer, and payments made under the eligible repayment plans (right plan, right employer, and on-time payments). Moreover, the “No Eligible Loans” category appears to include only borrowers who have no Direct Loans at the end of ten years when they apply.

\begin{itemize}
\item [67.] See infra notes 88–89.
\item [68.] OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., ED-OIG/A05Q0008, FEDERAL STUDENT AID: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF SERVICER NONCOMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICING FEDERAALLY HELD STUDENT LOANS (2019) [hereinafter OIG REPORT].
\item [70.] U.S. GOVT’ ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 60.
\item [73.] See, e.g., JUNE DATA REPORT, supra note 55.
\item [74.] Id.
\end{itemize}
Borrowers who started with ineligible loans, but consolidated into eligible Direct Loans during the 120 months, and did not realize the pre-consolidation payments don’t count are likely included in the “[insufficient] Qualifying Payments” category. Denials based on “Missing Information” are not broken down by category as to which information the borrower did not provide. However, it seems likely that most missing information would concern the borrower’s employers during the ten-year period, because servicers ought to have all necessary information to establish the other three criteria (right loan, right plan, and 120 on-time payments).

Congress attempted to fix the PSLF in 2018 by focusing on only one of these issues, namely, borrowers whose payments didn’t qualify because they were in the wrong payment plan. The Temporary Expanded Public Service Loan Forgiveness (TEPSLF) Program relaxed one of the four PSLF requirements that borrowers made their payments under a qualifying income-based repayment plan. Some borrowers doing qualifying public service work and making on-time payments for ten years did not qualify for PSLF because for some of the ten years they were on graduated or extended repayment plans instead of standard or income-based repayment. TEPSLF applicants must have applied for PSLF and have been rejected, and meet the other three eligibility tests. TEPSLF essentially allows payments made under the wrong plan to retroactively count. The borrower must still have qualifying Direct Loans, must have had their public service employment certified annually for all ten years, and must have made payments under the otherwise nonqualifying payment plans on time, i.e. within fifteen days of the due date.

The TEPSLF fix has not worked. As of April 2019, 38,460 borrowers applied for TEPSLF, but only 262 applicants have successfully had their loans discharged. Congress authorized $700 million for the program, but so far, only $10.6 million has been forgiven.

USED reported the following reasons for TEPSLF application denials: (1) borrower has not been in repayment for ten years (35%); (2) the borrower does not meet the TEPSLF payment requirements for payments during the last twelve months; (3) borrower did not provide the servicer the necessary information to establish the other three criteria (right loan, right plan, and 120 on-time payments).

75. See id.
78. See id.
79. Id.
81. Id.
months (20%); and (3) the borrower has no loans eligible to be discharged under the TEPSLF (15%).

Most denials are for not making enough qualifying payments. This could result from difficulties in certifying full-time qualifying employment, as well as simply not having made on-time payments, or other servicing problems with payment tracking, discussed in detail below.

C. Qualifying Payments

The USED servicer denied fifty-five percent of PSLF applications on the grounds that the applicant had made an insufficient number of qualifying payments. The data report defines this reason for rejection as follows:
The borrower submitted a completed application and was reviewed to determine if the payments made qualify based on [three of] the criteria for the program (on-time, in full, on a qualifying repayment plan, while working at a qualifying employer). The results show the borrower has not made 120 qualifying payments. The borrower is informed they do not qualify because they have not yet made enough qualifying payments. The borrower is instructed to continue making qualifying payments and to resubmit the forgiveness application once 120 payments have been made.

Superficially, it may seem that borrowers are simply jumping the gun, applying before they have been in repayment for ten years. However, this category also includes borrowers who have paid for ten years, but whose payments are not all counted as qualifying.

Borrowers who have not made 120 qualifying payments comprise at least five distinct problems identified by the CFPB, USED Inspector General, GAO, and borrower complaints, discussed in detail below:

1) Payments made may not be counted because they were made too early or too late, i.e. not within fifteen days of the due date.

2) Payments may not be counted because the servicer could not match an otherwise qualifying payment (right amount, right loan, or right plan) with an employment certification form (ECF). Payment matching may fail because the borrower’s employer did not qualify as public service during some months, the start and end dates on the ECF did not match the payment date(s), the ECF was rejected as not properly filled out, the ECF reflects less than full-time employment, i.e. fewer than thirty hours/week, or the borrower is unable to obtain an employer certification covering some months.

3) Payments may not be counted because of various servicer errors, including placing accounts in administrative forbearance when recertifying

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82. JUNE DATA REPORT, supra note 55, ¶ 21.
83. Id. ¶ 15.
84. Id. ¶ 25 (“Definitions” tab of the spreadsheet).
income-based payments, payments misrecorded due to servicing transfers, or because of other errors.

4) Payments made under a nonqualifying repayment plan or during forbearance or deferment do not qualify.

5) The borrower incorrectly believed that payments made prior to consolidating FFEL or Perkins loans into Direct Loans counted, therefore applied before making 120 payments after consolidating.

1. The “On-Time” Payment Issue

To qualify as on time, a payment must be made within fifteen days of the due date. USED apparently interprets this to mean that a payment made either after the fifteenth of the month or before the fifteenth of the prior month is not a qualifying payment, even if the borrower has paid 120 total payments when they apply. There are a variety of reasons a borrower might pay early, or late.

“Borrowers who received third-party loan repayment assistance [such as employer repayment assistance] complain that when their monthly benefit is more than their monthly payment the servicer may advance their monthly payments,” which can render future payments as nonqualifying, because early payments, like late payments, do not count as on time. Alternatively, borrowers may not receive subsidies to help make payments promptly enough to submit the payments within fifteen days after the due date. A borrower could have made total payments aggregating more than the required 120 payments but have some payments disqualified because of the timing issue. As one borrower reported in a CFPB complaint:

I consolidated my loans in XXXX of 2009 to become eligible for the public service loan forgiveness [(PSLF)] program. . . . Despite documentation from XXXX that my loans were consolidated as income contingent in XXXX 2009, . . . I continued to argue for income contingent between XXXX and XXXX 2009, and documentation supporting that my payment should have been $0.00 and qualified for PSLF, the current servicer XXXX has taken over a year to review my appeal. I have provided supplementary material twice and requested to see the documents provided by XXXX demonstrating I requested a forbearance when it would not be in my best interest and I have proof to the contrary. My requests for documentation have been ignored. . . .

I know there are XXXX other individuals facing similar issues with the PSLF program stationed in my area alone. For instance, if a servicemember

85. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(1)(iii) (2019). This is a regulatory requirement, not a statutory one. The statute only requires that the borrower “has made 120 monthly payments” under a qualifying payment plan. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1)(A).
86. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c).
87. CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 41.
pays just XXXX dollar more than what is owed, the payments don’t count and they tack months on the back end towards forgiveness.88

Borrowers who make a payment after the fifteenth of the month will not get credit, whether the lateness was due to borrower negligence or servicer miscommunications. Numerous borrower complaints in the CFPB database concern borrowers’ inability to get timely instructions about payment amounts and due dates from their servicers, especially when changing servicers or repayment plans.

2. The Employer Certification Issue

A borrower must be employed full time by a public service employer, at the time each of the 120 payments are made, for the payments to count.89 For the first five years of the program, USED failed to provide any means by which borrowers or their servicers could determine whether an employer qualified. Beginning in January 2012, USED developed an employer certification form (ECF) that borrowers could submit periodically to verify that they met the “right employer” criteria for PSLF.90 After having an employer sign the form, the borrower submits it to their servicer, who transmits it to PHEAA/FedLoan.91 FedLoan then reviews it, checks a list of employers provided by USED, and in the case of nonprofit employers, escalates the approval decision to USED itself.92 Once the form is approved, FedLoan instructs the other servicer to transfer servicing to FedLoan and notifies the borrower.93 USED and PHEAA have not given borrowers clear instructions about how frequently ECFs should be submitted.

USED has never created a comprehensive list of qualifying employers. PHEAA attempted to compile an employer database from approved ECFs, but USED faulted PHEAA’s process for vetting employers in the PHEAA database.94 The USED regulation also requires PHEAA to exclude “organizations engaged in religious activities,” an exclusion not mentioned in the governing statute.95 This requires the servicer to do additional evaluation of employer certifications beyond checking for tax-exempt status. To further complicate the task, USED requires PHEAA to carefully match the employment start and end dates appearing on ECF

89. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(2).
92. Id.
93. Id.
95. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(b) (2019); 20 U.S.C. §1087e(m)(3)(B). The regulation, but not the statute, also excludes labor unions and partisan political organizations.
forms to qualifying payments, month by month. Any payment that falls outside the start and end dates on an ECF does not count.

According to the CFPB report, “borrowers complained that servicers may be slow to provide them with accurate guidance” regarding their ECFs, with servicers taking months to respond to questions. Borrowers also complained of their ECFs being denied and servicers not providing sufficient information to understand the reason for their denial. One CFPB complaint relates the following:

My servicer, FedLoan/PHEAA, is alleging that dozens of my Public Service Loan Forgiveness payments do not qualify toward my 120 qualifying payments. I have worked for XXXX and I have submitted forms each year according to the instructions on the form. The form clearly stated at one point that if an employee is still at her current job she should write “today’s date” on the form. It now has a box that users can check that says “still employed.” I filled out my forms each year according to the instructions, either putting “today’s date” or checking the box, and now my servicer is not counting each certification as if I [was] employed at that employer. Rather, they are using the “current” date as my “end” date.

After filing annual employer certifications for five years, it is astounding to me that my servicer, FedLoan, has been miscounting my certifications all along. Nobody notified me about any of five forms I submitted. I only found all of this out when I had a separate problem with FedLoan. They are now saying that I must go back to my previous employers to have them re-certify my employment.

After calling FedLoan, they instructed me to only submit forms when I leave employers, rather than submit forms each year. Now I don’t know which advice to follow—to submit annual employer certifications or just wait until I think my 120 payments is up. What is the point of trying to stay current with my PSLF certifications if I am just going to have to go back and do this all over again?

Similarly, the plaintiff in Love v. PHEAA, a Georgia class action, asserts that she worked for ten years for a district attorneys’ association and various public defender offices, had her ECF approved in 2012, only to be told by FedLoan in 2018 that it issued its prior approval of her ECF in error. It is impossible at this

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96. Id.
97. Id.
98. CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 37.
99. Id.; see also Am. Bar Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that USED arbitrarily reversed its approval of the American Bar Association as a public service employer, to the detriment of several borrowers whose prior ECFs had been approved).
point to determine whether and to what extent employer certifications are erroneously rejected.

If a borrower did not submit ECFs each year during all ten years, they must go back and obtain written verification of qualifying employment for the entire repayment period or for any missing periods when they apply for loan forgiveness at the end of the ten years. It is likely that some denials based on “qualifying payments” are attributable to PHEAA determinations not to count periods of employment for which it disapproved one or more ECFs.

3. Administrative Forbearance, Servicing Transfers, and Lost Payments

Borrowers frequently report that servicers are not keeping accurate records of fully qualifying payments. As one borrower wrote, her loan servicer “has miscalculated my qualifying payments over the last two years, initially telling me I had only made 8 qualifying payments, then 21, then that they had to ‘further review’ my account after I had complained a number of times, indicating that I had, in fact, made closer to 60.” 102 When the same borrower followed up to check the status of her payment calculation, she was told it could take up to a year for the servicer to get back to her. 103

The CFPB report includes a variety of examples of servicer and borrower errors leading to incorrect qualifying payment counts. Borrowers complained that once they submit their ECF, the “servicer gives inaccurate counts of qualified payments made by borrowers,” and when they seek correction borrowers struggle to have their servicer correct the error or give reasons for why they provided the number that they did. 104 Borrowers also complained that when servicers fail to process a borrower’s income-based repayment (IBR) annual recertification on time, they remove borrower’s loans from IBR, which delays qualifying payments, increases monthly payments, and allows the loan to accrue more interest. 105 One CFPB complaint illustrates how a simple borrower error in recertifying IBR each year can disqualify the borrower’s payments:

I am currently repaying under the income driven repayment plan. My repayment is under the Income Based Repayment (IBR) and I am seeking the Public Service Loan Forgiveness as I currently work for a qualifying XXXX. My loan servicer is FedLoan. My IBR requires me to certify my

103 Id. Another borrower writes in an email: “When I first asked for a review of how many qualifying payments I’d made well over 6 or 7 years into my public service career, I was told the number was only 17 lol (so 1yr 5mos of payments). Incredulous, I called up, and a lady explained they’d misapplied a payment a while back and so subsequent payments hadn’t counted in their initial review. She assured me they’d recalculate soon. That was seriously probably two years ago. I’ve called a few times and just get told it takes a while.” Id.
104 CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 39.
105 Id at 39–40.
income yearly using my adjusted gross income (AGI) from my federal tax return. This year (XXXX) I was shocked to discover that my monthly payment jumped from \$140.00 per month in XX/XX/XXXX to \$1000.00 per month in XX/XX/XXXX. It is not even the XXXX XXXX, which I assumed I would have until at least that date to certify my income since that is the date taxes are due. Well I was wrong. My current IBR is still valid until XX/XX/XXXX, however there is some requirement that is hidden in some fine print somewhere that requires me to certify my income 90 days before my current IBR expired. As a result, all of my qualifying payments made toward my public service loan forgiveness have been wiped out, \$5000.00 of accrued interest that was not being added to my balance due to my IBR plan immediately got added on taking my balance from \$97000.00 to over \$100000.00, and there is no willingness of FedLoan to reverse any of this in light of the fact that I immediately submitted my income certification and they received the request prior to my payment due date and well prior to the actual expiration of my prior year IBR plan. This is absolutely depressing. All progress I made toward paying my loans on time and working toward the Public Service Loan Forgiveness is gone, my balance is even higher, and there just seems to be no end in sight. . . . I looked back and it appears I received XXXX notice giving me until XX/XX/XX to certify my income which came to my parent’s house (listed as my permanent address since I enrolled in college in XX/XX/XXXX). I had not even received all of my tax info by then and XXXX is before the date taxes are even due to the IRS.106

Borrower payments are also disqualified because of servicers’ misuse of forbearance. Forbearance is an account status that does not require the borrower to make any payment but during which interest continues to accrue. This practice is described in the Winebarger v. PHEAA class action complaint107 and in the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) class action against Navient.108 The AFT suit alleges that Navient misdirected borrowers eligible for income-based repayment into forbearance instead.109 The Winebarger suit, as well as enforcement actions brought by various state attorneys general, assert that PHEAA puts borrowers into forbearance while it processes the servicing transfer of a PSLF applicant’s account, while it recertifies an income-based payment plan, or while researching borrower disputes.110 During those months, payments the borrower makes are not counted, because technically no payments are due.
The CFPB sued one servicer, Navient, alleging that it systematically abused administrative forbearance in order to maximize servicing fees, when borrowers would have been better off in income-based repayment.\(^ {111}\) The class action complaint filed by American Federation of Teachers members also cites several instances of borrowers being told that income-based repayment was not available and that their best option would be forbearance status.\(^ {112}\)

4. Ineligible Payment Plans (Subject of the TEPRLF Fix)

Borrowers who made payments under graduated or extended payment plans will not have payments made under those plans counted for PSLF. According to the CFPB report, borrowers complain of servicers enrolling them into nonqualifying repayment plans, despite expressing interest in PSLF.\(^ {113}\) Borrowers also reported telling their servicer that they work in public service, but their servicers never informed them about PSLF or the repayment plan requirements for PSLF.\(^ {114}\) Rather than enrolling them into the requisite repayment plan for PSLF, servicers would enroll them into nonqualifying plans.\(^ {115}\) Other borrowers reported servicers incorrectly denying their applications for a qualifying income-driven repayment (IDR) plan or the servicer not accepting their applications.\(^ {116}\) Also, borrowers who return to school with outstanding student loans complain of servicers preventing them from remaining in qualified repayment plans.\(^ {117}\)

5. Waiting Too Long to Consolidate FFEL into Direct Loans

At inception, only a minority of borrowers were eligible for the PSLF program. The first borrower cohorts eligible for PSLF, those entering repayment in 2007 and 2008, mostly took out FFEL guaranteed student loans, which are ineligible for PSLF.\(^ {118}\) Only about twenty percent of federal student loans in those years were Direct Loans eligible for PSLF.\(^ {119}\) The majority of borrowers from those years had to use Federal Direct Consolidation Loans to convert ineligible FFEL loans to eligible Direct Loans to participate in PSLF.\(^ {120}\) Ineligible FFEL loans were phased

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\(^ {112}\) Class Action Complaint, supra note 107, ¶ 67.

\(^ {113}\) CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 33.

\(^ {114}\) Id. at 37.

\(^ {115}\) See id. at 38.

\(^ {116}\) Id. at 33.

\(^ {117}\) Id. at 34–35.


\(^ {119}\) See id. at T-13 to T-14.

\(^ {120}\) See id.
out by 2010.\textsuperscript{121} From that year onwards, the only student loans ineligible for PSLF were Perkins loans and private loans.\textsuperscript{122} The first borrowers to apply for PSLF in 2017 and 2018 report being confused or misinformed about the need to convert FFEL loans to Direct Loans before payments would begin counting towards the 120 for PSLF.\textsuperscript{123} An unknown number of denials for shortfalls in qualifying payments result from borrowers having made payments on FFEL loans prior to Direct Loan consolidation.\textsuperscript{124} Moreover, each time a borrower consolidates prior loans, payments made before the latest consolidation do not count towards PSLF.\textsuperscript{125}

According to the CFPB, borrowers reported spending years making payments, “believing they were making progress towards PSLF, before servicers explain that their loans do not qualify for PSLF.”\textsuperscript{126} One consumer complaint in the CFPB database is typical:

I worked full time for a qualifying public service organization from XX/XX/XXXX-XX/XX/XXXX. Fedloans Servicing refuses to honor payments made during this time for Public Service Forgiveness because I consolidated a XX/XX/XXXX XXXX along my previous consolidation done previously when XXXX serviced my loans. XXXX did not tell me that this would put my future . . . in jeopardy. I realize that this is not your problem, but this is what happened to me. Now, I am being made to pay for a mistake made by XXXX. They even denied counting my time to the Ombudsman.

Representatives from FedLoan Servicing told me is that a new consolidation was created when I consolidated my new loan taken in XX/XX/XXXX with my existing consolidated loans (XXXX was servicing the loans at the time). As a result, they will not count any of my payments time that I worked for a public service organization from XXXX (my loans were consolidated at that time). I let them know that I was not told by XXXX that this would jeopardize my public service loan forgiveness. I remember telling the XXXX customer service representative that I needed to consolidate my XX/XX/XXXX loan with my existing consolidation so that I could get credit for my time worked for a XXXX from XXXX. So, I proceeded with the consolidation paperwork not realizing that I would be in this situation. I am not trying to get out of paying. I just would like the time to count as I am working for a XXXX.\textsuperscript{127}

Borrowers also reported delays and defects in the process of consolidating their FFEL loans into a Direct Consolidation Loan, which they must do to qualify

\textsuperscript{121} Id. at T-15.
\textsuperscript{122} Id.
\textsuperscript{123} See CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 32–33.
\textsuperscript{124} Id. at 29–30.
\textsuperscript{125} Id.
\textsuperscript{126} Id. at 29.
for PSLF. This process should only take thirty days, but borrowers report processing taking upwards of six months due to the original servicer not providing the requisite information to their future servicer, or a number of servicing errors in which a servicer leaves necessary loans out of the consolidation process. These borrowers are understandably frustrated that payments they made before Direct Loan Consolidation do not qualify for PSLF credit.

PSLF denials based on insufficient qualifying payments thus result from multiple causes. While it is possible that some borrowers simply miscounted and applied prematurely, borrower miscalculation seems an unlikely explanation for all 55,000 PSLF applications rejected based on insufficient payments. Our own survey of CUNY Law graduates found that forty-five of sixty-nine respondents intend to apply for PSLF, and nearly half (twenty-one out of forty-five) reported problems with their servicers, mostly involving proper counting of payments. Servicer and servicing transfer errors are clearly a major factor. An unknown number of denials appear to result from overly rigid payment timing rules, servicer delays in consolidating ineligible loans and recertifying income-dependent payment plans, misinformation given to borrowers about eligible loans and payment plans, and perhaps erroneous rejections of employer certifications.

D. Denials Based on Missing Information

Twenty-four percent of rejected PSLF applications were rejected on grounds that the applicant had not entered all necessary information in their application. The data report defines this reason for rejection as follows:

The application for forgiveness submitted was incomplete or didn’t have all the required information necessary to process the application. In this case the borrower is notified of what information is missing and requested to submit the missing information. Once the required information is resubmitted, the application is reviewed again to determine if the borrower now qualifies for forgiveness.

Because the servicer should have records of the amount and timing of all borrower payments, the repayment plan in effect and the type of loan, the only information needed from the borrower would logically be whether their employer(s) qualified as public service and whether the borrower was employed full time. It is also possible that form design causes some borrowers to omit required responses.

Borrowers who submitted ECFs every year should not have this problem, but the ECF procedure is optional and voluntary. A borrower who did not submit

128. CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 31.
129. Id. at 32.
130. Survey of CUNY law graduates by Alan White, Professor, City Univ. of N.Y. L. Sch. (2019) (on file with author). For example, one graduate wrote: “It’s been a year, and FedLoan will not certify over 30 payments I made at a particular employer (while my servicer was Navient).” Id.
131. JUNE DATA REPORT, supra note 55, ¶ 14.
132. Id.
annual ECFs for ten years must go back and reconstruct employment histories, and
those cases are the likely cause of this rejection category. This issue is closely related
to the servicer’s difficulties (described above) in matching ECFs with payment
dates, resulting in payments not counting.

E. Denials Based on No Eligible Loans

Fifteen percent of rejected PSLF applications were rejected on grounds that
the applicant did not have any eligible loans. The data report defines this reason
for rejection as follows:

The borrower has requested forgiveness but the borrower does not have
Direct Loans that are eligible to participate in the PSLF program. Typically
these borrowers have FFEL [Federal Family Education Loans], Perkins or
private/non-federal loans. The borrower is informed they do not have
loans eligible for PSLF and informed that FFEL or Perkins loans could be
consolidated into DL, BUT they would then need to make 120 qualifying
payments on the new consolidation loan (no previous payments on the
FFEL or Perkins loans would count).

These cases are similar to “insufficient payments” cases where the borrower
consolidated FFEL or Perkins loans into eligible Direct Loans during the ten-year
period before applying, not realizing that pre-consolidation payments would not
count towards the required 120. In these worst-case scenarios, borrowers have paid
for the full ten years without realizing they could have converted ineligible loans to
eligible loans. Borrowers have reported being rejected for this reason on Twitter. As @joeagresti writes: “I was misled by my servicers . . . TWICE. I have already
made more than 120 on time payments and there is no end in sight as I found out
I am still in the wrong ‘type’ of loan.” Borrowers complained of servicers failing
to advise them that their loans were not eligible for PSLF, despite knowing that
borrowers were in public service jobs or are actively pursuing PSLF. Borrowers
then make years of payments that do not count towards the PSLF.

F. Denials Based on Employment Dates

Two percent of rejected PSLF applications were rejected on grounds that a
part of their employment in public service took place prior to the PSLF program
start date or prior to the disbursement of their loans. The data report defines this
reason for rejection as follows:

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 29.
137. CFPB REPORT, supra note 69, at 29–30.
138. Id.
139. JUNE DATA REPORT, supra note 55, ¶ 14.
The borrower submitted an application and the underlying employment dates do not qualify for forgiveness due to employment dates prior to the PSLF program start date (October 1, 2007) or employment dates prior to the disbursement dates on the loans requested for discharge. The borrower is informed that the application is denied and the employment dates do not meet the program requirements for discharge.\textsuperscript{140}

These borrowers should be able to reapply after making additional qualifying payments, and this category should soon disappear with the passage of time.

\textit{G. Denials Based on Ineligible Employer}

Two percent of rejected PSLF applications were rejected on grounds that their (presumably current) employer was not eligible under the requirements of the PSLF.\textsuperscript{141} The data report defines this reason for rejection as follows:

The borrower submitted an application that is requesting forgiveness based on an employer that has been deemed ineligible for the PSLF program. The borrower is informed their employer is not a qualified employer.\textsuperscript{142}

There has been some litigation around the definition of an eligible employer.\textsuperscript{143} The simplest cases are tax-exempt 501(c)(3) organizations and government employers, but “public service” is defined a bit more broadly in the statute and regulation. The statute and regulation include job types as well as employer types, such as health-care professionals, so that some employer certifications do require judgment on the part of the servicer or USED. Borrowers with these gray area qualifying job cases should have some due process means to appeal adverse decisions. While obviously important for borrowers with a legitimate dispute about meeting the public service definition, this category accounts for a relatively small part of the overall PSLF failure.

Payment counting and matching and employer certification paperwork thus account for the largest denial categories. Borrowers are denied cancellation because they made their payments too soon or too late in the month, because the start and end dates on their employer certifications don’t precisely match up, because boxes are not checked, and for various other bureaucratic reasons. Other borrowers have made payments on the wrong loans, or in the wrong payment plans, or were in forbearance because their servicers misinformed them. Virtually all of the denials appear to be potential false negatives—deserving applicants victimized by servicer incompetence or agency indifference.

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140. \textit{Id.} ("Definitions” tab of the spreadsheet).
141. \textit{Id.} \textsuperscript{\textsection}14.
142. \textit{Id.} ("Definitions” tab of the spreadsheet).
IV. Failure of the Contract State to Reconcile Public Goals

The public student loan program’s goals are multiple yet clear: (1) to require students to bear a major part of the cost of higher education, but based on ability to pay; (2) to maximize recovery of loan administration costs and loan losses; (3) to minimize defaults by aligning loan payments with borrower incomes; and, importantly, (4) to cancel debts for graduates and noncompleters based on individual need (e.g., disability) or to reward desirable employment choices (public service). The achievement or failure of each of these legislative goals is readily measurable.

Whether administered by public employees or private contractors, the difficulty in translating legislative desires to lived experience of borrowers is to create organizational culture that values each of the goals and rewards individual and group success in promoting the goals. While the ability and motivation of government bureaucrats to achieve legislative goals has been challenged by public choice theorists, the neoliberal solution of contracting out state functions doubles the difficulty. Instead of requiring an effective organizational culture in a single bureaucracy, contracting out requires both an effective organizational culture and the agency’s ability to construct and oversee contractual terms and relationships that result in private contractors adopting and promoting a similar culture. The fundamental problem with the contract state is this second layer of institutional design. Moreover, private contractors in the state-capitalist economy begin with a default culture of maximizing profits or at least maximizing economic outputs while minimizing costs. Agencies thus face the daunting task of translating multiple public goals into cost and output measures. The experience of the Education Department’s loan servicing contracts is telling.

As Fink and Zullo have pointed out, the actual servicing contracts with PHEAA and other servicers pay the servicers by loan volume and reward them for minimizing staff time spent working with borrowers. The paltry five dollar payment for administering a complete PSLF loan cancellation similarly fails to translate the legislative goal into contractor performance. The agency disdain for legislative goals other than maximizing repayments and minimizing costs reflects an organizational culture at the bureaucratic level that stands as an obstacle to full achievement of public policy. But even if we imagine an agency culture more aligned with congressional debt relief policy goals, the contracting-out model raises serious obstacles to translating legislative objectives into reality. Even an agency whose contracts included substantial financial rewards for contractors to identify and cancel debts of eligible borrowers would face the challenge of contractor culture that inevitably seeks to minimize costs.

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145. Fink & Zullo, infra note 11.
The experience of the Treasury’s attempts to contract with mortgage loan servicers to achieve home mortgage loan relief during the foreclosure crisis is instructive. The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) offered mortgage servicers Treasury payments of up to $5,000 per loan for successfully restructuring homeowner mortgages to prevent foreclosures.\textsuperscript{146} Even the significant HAMP payments were only partly successful in motivating mortgage servicers, the largest of which were major banks whose culture valued repayment over debt relief.\textsuperscript{147} Only one or two “specialty” servicers attempted a business strategy of maximizing HAMP loan modifications to maximize revenue from the Treasury payments.\textsuperscript{148} The inertial pull of bank culture continually promoted payment collection over aid to borrowers, even with a federal agency (somewhat) committed to preventing foreclosures and renegotiating loans. In the loan servicing context, the contract state model may be deeply incompatible with debt relief.

The PSLF program failure is also a case illustrating the oligopolistic power of a government contractor that has extensive program knowledge, experience, and revolving-door access to the contracting agency. As USED became more dependent on a few large servicers, like PHEAA, to run its mammoth loan program, its ability to shop competitively for other contractors became largely illusory, especially as personnel moved back and forth between contractor and oversight agency. PHEAA reportedly relied on extensive political ties to USED to avoid losing its contract or being sanctioned for poor performance.\textsuperscript{149}

The Education Department’s financial aid unit, which hires loan servicers like PHEAA to manage the payments of the roughly 45 million Americans who owe federal student loans, has long been a place where officials move between private industry and government. For instance, Mark LaVia, the career department official who oversees PHEAA and other student loan servicing companies, was a longtime PHEAA employee before he was hired during the Obama administration.\textsuperscript{150}

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\textsuperscript{150} Id.
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The contract state thus not only faces serious obstacles to implementing plural policy objectives, but also may fail to achieve purported competitive efficiencies when the relationship between agency and contractor becomes too cozy.

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Even if future administrations adopt sweeping student loan cancellation and fund all higher education through public appropriations, the administrative challenge of carrying out the debt cancellation will remain. In the more likely event that Congress adopts something short of universal and immediate student loan forgiveness, the PSLF experience teaches us that the contract state is unlikely to deliver fully on the legislative promise. One solution, advocated by Fink and Zullo, would be to abandon the contract state model and instead to transfer student loan servicing to a public agency. They suggest the IRS or the U.S. Postal Service, among others. If Congress fails to adopt a public option for loan servicing, the solutions will inevitably be more complex, although an effective loan cancellation program administered by the contract state is by no means unimaginable.

Remedies for the PSLF failure to date should be both retrospective and prospective. There should be a comprehensive audit of applications rejected to date to discover the obstacles to PSLF approvals, and to identify categories of errors and unduly strict review processes. Borrowers from the pre-2017 cohorts should have their forgiveness applications reviewed for servicing delays and errors, and be given credit for resulting payments made under the wrong plan or wrong loan. USED should apply flexible approaches to certify past employment for periods when annual certification forms were unavailable. Prospectively, PSLF can be simplified and properly implemented with a series of contractual, regulatory, and legislative fixes. In particular, the unduly strict and difficult to administer on-time payment rule should be relaxed; all payment plans and federal loan types should be eligible; employer certification should be automated using IRS employer information and a database of qualifying employers; applicants should have access to an effective appeal process; and USED should adequately compensate and incentivize its servicer for administering PSLF.

151. For example, presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren’s detailed student loan cancellation proposal sets income limits and other eligibility rules that would have to be administratively implemented, even if some income and debt information could be automatically retrieved from IRS filings and the National Student Loan Database. See Affordable Higher Education For All, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/affordable-higher-education/ [https://perma.cc/GHR9-ENWS] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020); see also Michael Lux, Expert Review of the Pete Buttigieg Student Plan, STUDENT LOAN SHERPA (Nov. 22, 2019), https://studentloansherpa.com/review-buttigieg-plan/ [https://perma.cc/352F-JK4Z] (describing candidate Pete Buttigieg’s plan to improve PSLF by forgiving some debt before the ten-year period ends).
152. Fink & Zullo, supra note 11, at 13–14.
153. Id.
A. Contract Oversight and Enforcement

Many of the causes of PSLF failure result from the failure of servicers to properly perform their contracts with USED. PHEAA/FedLoan has contracts to exclusively service all student loans for borrowers seeking a PSLF discharge. Once a borrower submits an Employer Certification Form and it is approved by the servicer, servicing of the borrower’s eligible loans is transferred from the current servicer to PHEAA/FedLoan (if FedLoan is not already the borrower’s servicer).  

Specific servicer errors identified in borrower complaints that contribute to PSLF program failure include the following:

1) Misusing administrative forbearance for PSLF participants caused by delays in certifying or recertifying income-based repayment or misinforming borrowers of their payment options.

2) Inaccurate payment records, especially after servicing transfers.

3) Failing to promptly process employer certification forms and treat all ECF submitters as PSLF prospects.

4) Delaying Direct Consolidation Loans for months.

5) Not training personnel to correctly inform borrowers of PSLF eligibility rules and of borrowers’ status in the PSLF program, so that borrowers remained in the wrong payment plan or wrong loan after certifying a public service job.

USED should use all available contract enforcement tools to correct servicer contract breaches. USED should require audits of all or a large sample of rejected PSLF applications, should require PHEAA to reprocess those reflecting servicer errors, and should establish an administrative review or appeal process for rejected PSLF applicants. USED should require non-PHEAA servicers to audit accounts for which ECFs were submitted to identify those that were not promptly advised to enter an eligible payment plan, consolidate ineligible loans if necessary, and transfer the loans to PHEAA for servicing. In those cases, servicers should be required to compensate borrowers for delay in qualifying for loan forgiveness. Borrowers misled by servicers into making nonqualifying payments should have those payments counted as qualifying or be compensated for the delayed forgiveness, either as an administrative or court-ordered remedy.

USED’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a critical audit report on FSA’s oversight of servicers on February 12, 2019. Like the CFPB report, the OIG report documents how servicers failed to tell borrowers about repayment options and miscalculated borrower payments in IDR’s, in violation of servicing contracts. The audit found that (1) FSA had failed to establish policies and

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155. See supra notes 79–120 and accompanying text.

156. OIG REPORT, supra note 68, at 2.
procedures that provided reasonable assurance that the risk of servicer noncompliance with requirements for servicing federally held student loans were mitigated; (2) “FSA’s oversight activities regularly identified instances of servicers’ not servicing federally held student loans in accordance with Federal requirements,” and FSA failed to produce an analysis adequate to identify recurring trends and instances of servicer noncompliance; (3) “FSA management rarely used available contract accountability provisions to hold servicers accountable for noncompliance,” and failed to “incorporate a performance metric relevant to servicer compliance . . . into its methodology for assigning loans to servicers”; and (4) “FSA employees did not always follow policy when evaluating the quality of servicer representatives’ interactions with borrowers, and FSA” failed to provide OIG with reports of failed calls to servicers.\textsuperscript{157}

In the OIG report, the office recommends that the FSA CEO “track all instances of noncompliance identified during FSA oversight activities, . . . and use records to identify trends and recurring noncompliance for each servicer and across all servicers; use the contractual accountability provisions available . . . to hold servicers accountable for noncompliance,” “such as requiring the return of funds or reducing future loan volume”; and “regularly share the results of any FSA loan servicing oversight activities with servicers.”\textsuperscript{158}

USED knew by 2016 that hundreds of thousands of student loan borrowers planning to apply for PSLF were headed for rejection as they started applying in late 2017.\textsuperscript{159} The Department concluded its own review of PHEAA’s administration of PSLF on October 25, 2016, about a year before the first cohort of borrowers would become eligible for loan cancellation.\textsuperscript{160} At the time of the review, 449,860 borrowers were designated as PSLF participants, presumably because they had at least one approved public service employer certification form. The reviewers audited a sample of thirty-four borrower loan files and found that fifty-three percent had ZERO qualifying payments. Of those, about forty percent were in a nonqualifying payment plan and sixty percent had ECFs with employment periods ending more than one year prior to the review date, in other words, no current evidence of qualifying employment.\textsuperscript{161} Given that all of these borrowers submitted at least one ECF, it is reasonable to assume that most, if not all of them, were unaware that they were making no progress towards the required ten years of repayment.

Instead of faulting PHEAA for a situation in which half of borrowers were in danger of not getting PSLF credit for their payments, USED delved into the minutiae of PSLF payment counting and found two instances of payment-counting errors resulting from servicing transfers. In their recommendations, the USED

\begin{itemize}
\item[157.] Id.
\item[158.] Id. at 3.
\item[159.] Id. at 4.
\item[160.] COMM. ON EDUC. & LAB., supra note 94.
\item[161.] Id.
\end{itemize}
reviewers stress “it is imperative that Fedloan Servicing and FSA partner to ensure only those truly eligible for forgiveness receive this benefit.”162 No mention is made of any need to get in touch with the fifty percent of borrowers who are in the wrong payment plan or do not have up-to-date employer certifications.163 In other words, USED’s audit reflected its primary concern with avoiding false positives and a complete lack of concern for false negatives.

USED has failed to oversee and enforce its PSLF contract with PHEAA. This may be due to an agency culture that views the mission as maximizing student loan collections and does not value delivery of loan cancellation or payment relief. It may be due to the inherent conflict between those two missions. It may be due to inadequate agency resources devoted to making PSLF a reality for millions of potentially eligible former students. Regardless of the cause, USED must dramatically improve its contract oversight and enforcement for PSLF to function as Congress intended.

B. Contract Design

USED’s ten-year servicing contracts were due to expire at the end of 2019. These contracts should not be renewed for another ten years without addressing the failure of the PSLF program. While USED could make better use of existing contract enforcement tools, the contract incentives and performance metrics should be redesigned. The teachers’ union lawsuit describes in detail the disincentives servicers face under current contracts: any servicer other than PHEAA will lose the servicing income from any account once the borrower’s ECF form is approved and the account is transferred to PHEAA, thus discouraging servicers from telling borrowers about PSLF or helping them qualify.164 The suit also points out that administrative forbearance is lucrative for servicers because it is lower cost and allows interest to continue accruing.165

USED does not pay PHEAA to help borrowers successfully navigate PSLF and obtain their discharge. Based on our review of publicly available contract documents, the only payments USED makes to PHEAA are five dollars for the first approved ECF submitted, and $2.50 for each disapproved ECF.166 According to the New York Attorney General’s complaint,

[b]ecause FedLoan receives only the small flat fee to evaluate a borrower’s initial eligibility and determine the number of PSLF-qualifying payments at

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162. Id. at 7.
163. COMM. ON EDUC. & LAB., supra note 94, at 3. The authors of the October 25, 2016 review (Debbie Johnson, Larry Porter, and Christian Lee Odom of SFA) note on the first page that it is for internal USED use only and is a policy deliberation document, presumably to shield it from FOIA release. It became public when the House Education and Labor Committee released the review as an exhibit to the committee’s October 2019 report on the PSLF fiasco.
165. Id.
166. U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., SINGLE SERVICER CONTRACT, supra note 50.
that time, its incentive is to perform that task as quickly and cheaply as possible, regardless of quality of service.\textsuperscript{167} Further, since FedLoan is paid only for the initial eligibility determination and payment count, when a borrower submits a subsequent ECF, as borrowers are encouraged to do annually by the Department of Education, it receives no additional compensation for updating the borrower’s payment count or for assisting borrowers with their ongoing participation in the program. FedLoan thus has an incentive to minimize the effort it expends updating payment counts every time a borrower files a new ECF.\textsuperscript{168}

USED must compensate the PSLF servicer adequately for the work required to review and approve borrower applications. Performance measures and related incentives and penalties should reward servicers for helping borrowers certify public service employment and ultimately qualify for PSLF.

Contracts could also call for better technology to automate PSLF processes and facilitate borrower participation. For starters, borrowers should have an easy method to opt into the PSLF program when they first enter repayment. Initial communications to borrowers entering repayment should include a PSLF opt-in button and an employer certification form. Employers should be able to certify full-time employment and government or nonprofit status using a simple electronic form. Better yet, servicers should retrieve the borrower’s employer ID number from the IRS together with income information for income-based repayment, using the IRS data retrieval tool. USED and IRS should provide an online lookup for servicers to identify government and 501(c)(3) exempt employers. The servicer’s monthly billing statement should include a flag for any borrower who opted in to PSLF, should provide a running total of qualifying payments, and should explain whether the most recent payment counted and if not, why not. Borrowers should be able to check their PSLF payment progress online in real time.\textsuperscript{169}

C. Regulatory Fixes

1. Qualifying Payments

The on-time payment requirement is not in the statute; the law only requires that the borrower “has made 120 monthly payments.”\textsuperscript{170} USED could revise or eliminate its current within-fifteen-days regulatory criterion for qualifying payments. While there may be policy reasons to prevent borrowers from making a large

\textsuperscript{168} Id.
\textsuperscript{170} 20 U.S.C. §1087e(m)(3)(B).
lump-sum payment to obtain a discharge, a more flexible rule would capture many early or slightly late payments allowing borrowers to qualify sooner. For example, a borrower should qualify if the account is current, was in qualifying payment plans for a total of 120 months, and does not reflect any single payment greater than 270 days late (the current definition of default). In addition, voluntary payments made during forbearance that are greater than or equal to the borrower’s payment in their previous qualifying plan should be counted as made under the previous plan.

2. Eligible Employers

The statute defines public service job broadly, to include government, military, nonprofit 501(c)(3) organizations, and various occupational categories, such as health-care practitioners, social workers, and public interest law services. The USED regulation defines the term “public service organization” in a manner essentially parallel to the statutory definition. There are about 5.6 million employers in the United States and about 1.5 million nonprofit organizations. The USED regulation would be more effective and easier to administer if it referred, in addition to easily identifiable government and tax-exempt 501(c)(3) employers, to objectively identifiable Department of Labor occupational categories covered by the statute. On the other hand, Congress created some of the complexity as to the “right employer” criteria in its lengthy statutory definition, which may need to be simplified. Senators Gillibrand and Kaine’s proposed legislation would additionally require the USED to establish a database of qualifying federal and state employers to help some borrowers qualify automatically, which would streamline the certification process significantly.

D. Legislative Fixes

Congress could make PSLF work better by addressing two problems: the restrictions on qualifying payments and the complicated definition of public service job. Borrower denials due to “wrong payment plan” or “wrong loan” could be readily avoided with simplifying legislation that would count all borrower payments under any repayment plan and would retroactively include payments made on FFEL.

171. Id.
172. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(2) (2019).
and Perkins loans. Consolidation loans should not restart the payment clock; in other words, pre-consolidation payments should count as well. Congress also made PSLF more cumbersome to administer by defining a lengthy list of public service jobs.\textsuperscript{175} The statutory definition may reflect some important policy choices, such as including nurses in for-profit as well as nonprofit hospitals, but at a high cost in terms of ease of administration. A definition based solely on the identity of the employer, that USED can translate into a lookup table or database, would be more workable. It is thus not entirely unfair to assign some blame for the program’s failure to the congressional policy choices and program design. Nevertheless, the lived experience of thousands of student loan borrowers paints a bleak picture of bureaucratic and contractor failure.

**Conclusion**

The student debt crisis is only amplified by the failure of USED and its servicers to implement PSLF. The broad goals of the program, which appropriately reduce debt burdens for lower-paid essential military, government, and public service workers, represent a plausible compromise between complete student loan cancellation and an entirely student-funded system of higher education. The original concept was relatively simple, and the statute and regulation can be further simplified. PSLF success, however, must depend not only on better legislative and regulatory design, but an organizational culture at USED and its contractors that regards granting of loan discharges to qualified PSLF applicants as an important measure of success. It may be that the failure of PSLF is endemic to the contracting-out model adopted by USED and FSA, and that a true solution requires a public servicer or a dedicated servicer properly constituted and compensated to achieve the program’s goals.

\textsuperscript{175} See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m).